In years to come, it is likely that historians will refer to this article in text and footnotes. Probably one of the most controversial commentaries since Billy Mitchell said said airplanes could sink battleships, the Colonel's views may get him in the same place as Gen. Mitchell -- at the defense table of a court martial. Serving officers do not attack the higher command levels of the military -- for any reason. Read between the lines, the article suggests that America is not just on the wrong path -- as a majority of Americans believe -- but that we are reading from the wrong map and the compass is sitting inches from an electromagnet that is "on."

It is very refreshing to see admission of guilt. However, I doubt that his superiors will learn a thing and retribution will be swift and sure. A brave man who just sunk his career. My one detractor is that he fails to show the culpability of the civilian leadership and this administration.

This superbly reasoned and hard-nosed essay takes a realist's approach to understanding the role of senior military officers in US statecraft. It offers a serious recommendation to Congress on how to exercise their oversight function to increase the accountability of officers for courageously telling the truth. Some will dismiss the analysis of the present Iraq conflict as "20/20 hindsight," but the author successfully makes the case that there was plenty of foresight.

Lt.Col. Yingling has Common sense, and common sense ain't common. Strange to hear about war in such a dispassionate and clearly well considered way. This piece suggests to me what war collage would be about.

Y E S. IT CONFIRMS THE OBVIOUS, THOUGH THE INTERACTION OF THE GENERALS WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, IF ANY, IS UNKNOWN.

I would categorize this piece as outstanding and well-reasoned expository writing, as it presents the author's authoritative opinion on a carefully limited range of expertise. At the beginning, he expressly confines the content to the responsibilities of military leaders and the civilian leaders who appoint them. He also clearly states a three-point argument that military failure in Vietnam and Iraq: that generals have a resposibility to society to provide policymakers with correct estimates of strategic probabilities; America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility; and that the remedy for this crisis requires the intervention of Congress. The author does not delve into the morality of policy, or ... More »

Great expert opinion; nothing quite like getting it from the proverbial "horse's mouth"!

An article which tells it like is really is by someone who should know. And who will be now destroyed by the American neo fascist government because that's the way neo fascists react--destroy all who dare oppose. At the runup to the war, one general did speak up, saying we needed three times more troops if America was ever to prevail. He was immediately fired. There is great danger afoot in this land.

Excellent analysis, and fine spelling ! Decision making is the result of a dialog between the generals and the civil authorities (President and Congress). Thus, if these civil authorities are themselves poorly educated, they won't ask the right questions and will perform poorly, whatever the level of the generals.

This is the first complete, accurate analysis of the problem that I have seen. It is absolutely outstanding.

Expecting to get corect estimation of stratigic probabilities of war from general is like asking farmer to predict the weather forcast. They have to listen to weatherman. However it is afailure in generalship that not to anticipate new mode of fighting after Vietman war.