A nonpartisan argument that says the odds of taxpayers turning a profit on their $50 billion investment in GM are very low. Even handed, not mere alarmism. Gives GM the benefit of the doubt in several spots.
It’s certainly fair to acknowledge that as long as the U.S. government remains GM’s majority shareholder, every one of its policy initiatives in the transportation or energy sector, whether it’s mandating better fuel economy or introducing new safety standards, will be weighed for its impact on the people’s car company.
On the other hand, it’s likely that the quicker that sale takes place, the lower the price the government gets and the more potential recovery for taxpayers will be left on the table.
That GM was still an American industrial behemoth, not the comparatively pipsqueak new GM expected to emerge after a three-month slimming treatment in bankruptcy spa. To be fair, the old GM also had more than $130 billion in debt, which considerably raised its overall “enterprise value;” the new GM will start out with much less debt and consequently harbor more potential value for the stockholders.
There’s a microscopic chance that taxpayers will turn a profit — if the company’s fortunes and the economy unexpectedly surge and the government stays in for the long haul. Still, if you were a conventional stock market maven, you would probably take one look at this deal and run like hell. Even so, there’s a remote chance it may someday pay off.
What it’s providing is a bridge to allow GM and its dependents to reach what may be a profitable future. With the government’s help, the company may deliver on its promise or it may not; the only certain thing is that without the government’s help, it has no chance.